Introduction
The application of biotechnology in industries such as pharmaceuticals, fermentation and agriculture has a long history; for example, farming techniques have traditionally utilised methods such as natural selection and cross breeding to manipulate the inherited characteristics of plants and animals. However, current interest and expansion in the field of biotechnology lies primarily in the use of genetic modification (GM). The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (1992) described GM as a key enabling technology facilitating major innovation in the health care, chemical, agricultural and food sectors leading to the invention of new drugs, agrochemicals and breeding of plants and animals. The techniques make it possible to tailor organisms to be safer, more specific and more productive in what they do than their unmodified counterparts (HSE, 1995) .
Risks from the new biotechnology
GM is defined as "the altering of the genetic material in that organism by a way that does not occur naturally by mating or natural recombination or both" (HSE, 1993) . GM techniques can circumvent barriers that would naturally restrict DNA exchange between unrelated species (OECD, 1986) and it is this factor which has raised public concerns and fuelled debates about the human and environmental risks as well as ethical issues arising from the application of the technology (Miles et al., 1994) .
Many of the potential hazards arising from the use of GM/GMOs (genetically modified organisms) in research laboratories and industrial settings are similar to those from the use of other biological agents. They include the possibilities of:
• infection of humans, animals or plants from the host, recipient or vector organisms; • toxic or allergic effects arising from the GMO, its components or its metabolic products;
• toxic or allergenic effects arising from the product expressed by the GMO; • environmental effects resulting from the accidental release of GMOs (OECD, 1986 ).
More specific potential hazards associated with GM work have been recognised, several of which have an environmental impact. These include:
• The production of more infectious or drugresistant micro-organisms.
• The transfer of harmful genetic material (for example material associated with cancer) to humans via a GMO. • Aggressive genetically modified plants which could colonise the surrounding environment, eliminating plants already living there.
• The transfer of genetic material from a modified plant which might be transferred to a related plant that is considered a weed, making it more competitive, for example, by enabling it to become resistant; • Interference of the natural recycling of nutrients in the environment by modified micro-organisms.
All laboratory work in the UK is regulated by legislation to ensure that workers are adequately protected against risks arising from their work. Much of the health and safety legislation is reactive and was developed as a result of accidents and/or diseases arising in the workplace. In contrast, the regulatory controls applying specifically to GM work were developed as a precautionary response to the types of conjectural risks outlined above (since no diseases/accidents attributable to GM techniques exist) and therefore represent a "proactive" regulatory approach justified on the basis of complexity and uncertainty. The issue of complexity primarily applies to the release of GMOs into the environment; ecologists argue that it is impossible to define unambiguously the consequences of a release or escape of GMOs because of the immense complexity of interactions within living ecosystems (Frommer et al., 1989; Mellon, 1991) . Uncertainty, however, applies to all work with GMOs, and is related to its relatively recent origins and innovative techniques (Tait and Levidow, 1992) .
[ 101 ] , 1993) . Only the Contained Use Regulations which are designed to facilitate the safe contained use and handling of GMOs in the workplace are considered in this article. They differ from previous UK regulations governing GM, in that risks to the environment from work involving genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMs) are addressed in addition to the risks to human health and safety. Environmental risks arising from larger genetically modified organisms, such as plants and animals, are dealt with by the Environmental Protection Act 1990.
"Contained use" of GMOs is defined as an activity in which there are "physical barriers, possibly supplemented by chemical or biological ones, limiting contact between the organism and the population and environment" (HSE, 1993) .
The Contained Use Regulations are designed to ensure that the use and handling of GMOs is carried out safely under conditions of containment. These regulations are supplemented by guidance published by the Advisory Committee on Genetic Modification (ACGM). This body consists of representatives of employers, employees, scientists and medical specialists who advise on the regulations and provide an approved framework for carrying out risk assessments (Cripps, 1992; Kinderlerer, 1992) . Containment measures for GM work specified by the ACGM consist of a combination of safe operating practices, containment equipment and facilities design tailored to the level of risk of the work undertaken.
The containment requirements of the Contained Use Regulations not only limit the exposure of workers and other persons to the GMOs and to their products, but prevent the release of potentially hazardous agents into the outside environment (OECD, 1986) . They are an integral part of the regulatory controls which have been developed to control the risks to the environment arising from the accidental release of GMOs.
Physical containment is the primary means by which organisms are contained during GM/GMO work and includes three elements: 1 containment equipment; 2 safe operating practices and techniques; and 3 facility design.
Containment can consist of both primary and secondary forms, the former designed to protect the workers and the immediate vicinity from release and the latter to protect the wider environment and people outside of the laboratory. While containment equipment is used to ensure primary containment and suitable design of facilities ensures secondary containment, safe operating procedures and practices for the personnel involved are vital to both (OECD, 1986) .
Other requirements within the Contained Use Regulations
The regulations also require sites to undertake a human health and environmental risk assessment for any activity involving GM/GMOs and notification of the activity to the HSE (Kinderlerer, 1992) . These risk assessments must be recorded and kept for at least ten years after the activity has ceased and must be submitted to the HSE as part of the notification procedure for certain types of work. Notification procedures vary according to the hazards of the organisms used and the scale and purpose of the work, and are summarised in Table I .
Biosafety training
Training and instruction of personnel in biosafety is important in order to impart information on safe operating procedures, particularly because of the relative predominance of human error in accident causation. Israeli (1986) found that 80 per cent of laboratory acquired infections caused by an identifiable accident occurred as a result of human error and only 20 per cent were due to equipment error. Similarly, studies of safety in high technology industries (such as the nuclear industry) have concluded that the main source of accidents lies in the potential for human error, since engineering devices have reached a high level of sophistication (ACSNI, 1990 dent causation, appropriate instruction and training for personnel working with GM/GMOs is essential (Andrup et al., 1990) . The 1986 OECD guidelines on safety considerations for applications of recombinant DNA stipulate that personnel working with potentially infectious agents or allergenic/toxic materials must be aware of any potential hazards and must be trained and proficient in the practices and techniques necessary for the safe handling of such materials.
Research findings
Recognising the important role that biosafety training plays in the attainment of "contained" use and thus the avoidance of accidental release and consequent environmental damage, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) commissioned a preliminary study to identify the level, content, format and extent of biosafety training currently provided at sites undertaking GM/GMO operations (Ford et al., 1995) . Data for the research were collected by means of a postal questionnaire administered to all sites currently notified to carry out GM/GMO activities, plus 20 in-depth case studies of selected sites. A response rate of 41.2 per cent was obtained from the postal survey and the characteristics of respondents correlated closely with the characteristics of the total population of sites surveyed in terms of organisational type. The ratio of public to private sector sites undertaking GM work was almost 3:1, with universities constituting the largest group of respondents followed by public sector research institutes and industrial sites (Figures 1 and 2) .
Of all projects undertaken at the respondent sites, 85 per cent were classified as containment level 1, which represents the lowest level of risk, and almost half of the respondents undertook work only at this level. Only 9 per cent of projects undertaken by respondents used Group II (pathogenic) organisms and only 3 per cent of projects were classified as Type B (large-scale) (see Appendix for definitions of Types A and B). Currently the highest risk projects undertaken at respondent sites were at containment level 3, with only 2 per cent of all projects being undertaken at this containment.
Training provision
The main findings of the survey were that overall, high levels of training were said to be provided for GM personnel at notified sites, however, extensive variations existed in the content, format and perceived quality of the training for different staff groups and different sites.
Variations first arose in the areas covered in the training received by different staff. Training in practical skills such as good microbiological practice was concentrated among bench staff and production workers, whereas managers and biological safety officers (BSOs) received high levels of training in the legislation covering GM work and in risk assessment procedures (see Table II ). This variation suggests the topics being addressed did reflect the roles and responsibilities of those being trained. The frequency of training provided to personnel was also found to vary across staff groupings (see Table III ). While research and technical staff were generally trained on recruitment, when they became exposed to new risks and continually on the job, management rarely received GM safety training on recruitment and were most likely to receive it only when legal requirements/duties were introduced. Refresher training was rarely offered to any of the GM worker groups.
Methods of delivering training identified in the questionnaire included off-the-job training, on-the-job training and the provision of written information. The use of these different methods at the respondent sites was found to vary depending on the roles and responsibilities of different personnel. While managerial staff relied heavily on receiving written information regarding safety rather than engaging in more participative forms of training, on-the-job training combined with written information was the most common means of delivering training and instruction to both bench staff and to production workers.
The management of training
The survey revealed evidence of poor management of safety training for GM/GMO work. Only 40 per cent of sites reported having systems for monitoring the provision of training and many of these had informal arrangements, such as on-the-job monitoring by supervisors.
Variations arose between public and private sector sites in the systems used to manage GM safety training. For instance, while 71 per cent of private sector sites reported that written training records were kept, only 21 per cent of public sector sites stated that they kept such records. The written records at private sector sites consisted of a formal training system, specifying appropriate outcomes for each level of training, ensuring competency was achieved in each area. Safety training at many public sector sites was managed departmentally and since many departments were small, the use of informal training without any centralised planning was frequently adopted. While this informality may be appropriate in certain situations (e.g. where low risk work is undertaken and staff have already received training in GMP), problems were reported in those cases where staff responsible for the provision of training felt inadequately equipped; where they had insufficient time and resources available to deliver the training; or where their negative attitudes towards safety hindered training provision.
Present guidance about safety training for the ACGM is minimal and describes in broad terms the training inputs required for each containment level; for example, for GM work at containment level 3, it is suggested that: "laboratory personnel must have had training in handling level 3 micro-organisms" (ACGM/HSE /DOE, 1988) . No guidance is given on the particular areas in which staff should be competent. Our results suggest that it may be more useful to specify appropriate training outcomes (in a similar manner to the COSHH Regulations and the accompanying Approved Code of Practice). It would be particularly helpful if the appropriate training actions for each containment level were defined.
Organisational arrangements for biosafety
A comparison of the organisational arrangements for GM safety at public and private sector sites revealed that public sector sites, the majority of which were universities, tended to have decentralised arrangements, with responsibilities for biosafety devolved to individual departments; whereas private sector sites had more centralised arrangements, allowing standardisation across the whole site. The MHSW Regulations require employers to appoint competent person(s) to assist them in complying with health and safety legislation; ACGM advise that at GM sites, a BSO should be appointed to fulfil this role. Variations between public and private sector sites were apparent in the nature of the BSO's role. In the private sector, a single BSO with a full time advisory role was generally appointed for the whole establishment. The decentralised arrangements within universities, however, necessitated the appointment of BSOs at department level. Some universities appointed an additional BSO to the central safety office (a university BSO (UBSO)) and their role was to liaise with the departmental BSO.
This liaison varied widely at different sites and often reflected the cultural ethos of that university. BSOs within universities and research institutes were usually appointed from among existing research or academic staff and undertook this role in addition to their other responsibilities, creating the potential for conflicting priorities. Case studies of such establishments suggested that the support received by departmental BSOs and their own perceived levels of competence varied markedly, according to the time they had available to spend on the role, the training they had received and the extent and quality of communications with the central safety office. Some of the departmental BSOs at university sites were clearly unsure as to where their legal responsibilities lay.
Conclusions
Although the results of the research revealed widespread provision of information, instruction and training to personnel working with or managing GM operations, the nature and quality of the training provided did vary. Differences in the nature of training delivery according to personnel type generally reflected differences in the types of tasks carried out, e.g. higher levels of on-the-job training for personnel carrying out predominantly practical or skill-based tasks, such as research assistants, technicians or production workers. It is, however, of some concern that much of the training in GM safety for managers consisted primarily of the provision of written information rather than engagement in more participative forms of training. The research suggests that resources were devoted to biosafety training, but in some organisations particularly those in the public sector, the evaluation of safety training was not being addressed.
Confusion over the content of training appropriate for GM safety was apparent among personnel working at notified sites. Some form of instruction and training is necessary for work at all levels of containment and the specification of competency levels would enable those who felt that they were not adequately trained to measure their existing competencies against approved standards. These standards would also facilitate more effective planning and management of training at a local level by facilitating the identification of the training needs of staff. While the specification of competency levels for safe GM work would assist in the management of training provision, the results also implied that sites require further guidance on appropriate means by which safety training could be monitored and evaluated.
More detailed guidance is also required on the roles, responsibilities and competencies of BSOs, since at present there is wide variation in their perceived competence and effectiveness. This information would facilitate the identification of individuals suitable for the position of BSO, enhance the assessment of their training needs, clarify their role for employers/managers and provide a focus around which management and BSOs in each establishment or department could negotiate an achievable workload to suit local conditions and resources.
Human error plays an important role in accident causation and if the accidental release of potentially harmful GMMs is to be avoided employees must be aware of any potential hazards and trained to be proficient in the practices and techniques necessary for safe handling.
